449 within those constraints. Sorting historical inconsistencies through the screen of physical laws, partly justifies computer simulation. Too, by wearing physics-based eyeglasses, new insights and connections may appear in the Johnstown Flood story that had been invisible before. Fig. 2 . Johnstown before the flood. View looks down Stoney Creek River toward the Stone Bridge. Note the infilling at the river banks and the construction virtually in the river bed. You can imagine that it would not take much of a flood to float these wood frame structures from their foundation can carry them off.
Tsunami Ball approach.
This article closely follows Day (2010a, 2010b) who simulated wave runup and inundation from the 1958 Lituya Bay Alaska and the 1963 Viaont, Italy landslide disasters. Simply put, tsunami balls are pencil-like columns of water gravitationally accelerated over a 3-D surface. The volume density of tsunami balls at any point equals the thickness of the water column there. Tsunami balls care little if they find themselves on parts of the surface originally under water or on parts originally dry. Such indifference is made-to-order for flood-like inundations.
Tsunami Ball flow chart.
The tsunami ball method distills to six flow chart steps. A. Distribute N tsunami balls over initially wet areas at initial positions r j with regular spacing ΔxΔy. B. Assign each ball a zero initial velocity and a volume V j =ΔxΔyH(r j ) based on the initial water thickness at the site H(r j ). C. Evaluate the water surface (, ) g t ζ r at time t on a fixed set of grid points r g ( Figure 3 ) In (1), V j is the fixed water volume of the j-th ball, r j (t) is the ball's location at time t, h(r g ) is topographic elevation and A(r g ,r j (t)) is an averaging function with m -2 units such that when integrated over all (x,y) space
Operation (1) smoothes tsunami ball volume at arbitrary positions r j (t) to grid positions r g . D. Accelerate each tsunami ball for a short duration Δt using () (, ) ( 
The r g here is the grid point closest to the ball's position, h ∇ is the horizontal gradient and (, ) smooth g t ζ r is a version of (1) smoothed over time and space.
E. Update the ball position, 2 (t) t (t+ t)= (t)+ (t) t+ 2t
ball velocity,
(t) (t+ t)= (t)+ t t j jj
and time t=t+Δt. F. Here you might return to Step (D) several times keeping the surface fixed at its most recent evaluation (inner loop); or, return to Step (C) to compute a fresh surface (outer loop). Regardless if the tsunami ball is in water or has been tossed onto land, steps (C) to (F) hold. Note that acceleration (3) includes a dynamic drag friction to control balls that might encounter unreasonably steep surface gradients and run away. I specify C d in Section 4. What in the flow chart makes the flood? Floods and waves get stirred if the underlying topography h(r) in (1) becomes a function of time
where h o (r) is the original value in flow chart step (B) and Δh(r,t) is the bottom uplift or subsidence due to a earthquake, landslide or in this case, failure of the South Fork dam.
Stabilization.
Numerical stability is the primary concern in any approach that employs granular material, particularly with respect to evaluating the gradient operator in (3) that drives the balls. Fluid simulations especially, because they have both flow-like and wave-like behaviors, can run amok rapidly. No single recipe guarantees stability, but I find that combinations of the three methods below usually can generate simulations that " look right" . (a) Spatial Smoothing. Water surface ( , ) g t ζ r = H(r g ,t) + h(r g ) at grid points r g is the sum of water thickness and topographic elevation. Both functions need to be spatially smoothed. The fastest means for this is rectangular smoothing, first applied to all grid rows and then to all grid columns. The q-th smoothed value in a grid row or column might be 
where G r are raw values in the row or column, W is the half width of smoothing and Norm is some normalization. The q+1-th smoothed value is 1 11 1 ;w q w
GG G Norm
You can see that each value (8) derives from the previous value (7) by only one addition, one subtraction and one division. The number of numerical operations in rectangular smoothing is proportional to the number of grid points only, and independent of both the number of balls and the smoothing half width. It takes experimentation to select an appropriate smoothing width. Smoothing width for the topography may not be the same as that for the water thickness. The goal is to stabilize the calculation, not to lose interesting aspects nor add many artifacts. I run the simulation on the smoothed topography, but display it on unsmoothed topography. smooth ∇ ζ r reinforces velocity v j (t), then fractional gravity ε x g, acts. If (13b) is persistently met over several time steps, the tsunami ball accelerates to terminal velocity soon enough, whereas reaction to short lived stimulus is less. Herein lies the temporal smoothing.
1889 flood simulation: input information
As mentioned earlier, delving into the Johnstown Flood reveals lots of information --much of it mistaken, dramatized, conflicting, or just not quantitative. I found certain post-event investigations and records of the Pennsylvania Railroad inquiry to be most helpful. Railroad engineers, conductors, station agents, yard masters, signal tower and telegraph operators were competent people accustomed to detailed observation and living according to schedules. In the course of their jobs, many had access to accurately set clocks. South Fork Dam. While the center half of the South Fork Dam vanished in 1889, its two ends exist to this day largely unaltered from their original configuration. Engineering diagrams from a 1891 investigation fix the elevation of the eastern end of the original 1853 dam at 1613.34 (491.9 m). It is generally agreed that the center of the 1887 dam was rebuilt lower than the original one by several feet to accommodate two-way carriage traffic. (This decision reduced spillway capacity and largely contributed to the 1889 overtopping.) The 1891 engineering diagram places the center of the rebuilt dam at 1610.76 feet (491.1 m). Hours before failure, workers hastily ran a two foot high dirt bank across the top of the dam attempting to stem the overflow. At failure, water ran one or two feet over that bank. I put the final lake level at 1614 feet (492 m). Reportedly, the lake was rising about 1 foot per hour at the time of failure. Supposing that it takes the lake one and one-half or two hours to drain, inflows would add an equivalent 1-2 feet to lake level. For purposes here, I fix " Effective Lake Level" at 493 m. Adding a virtual dam to a modern Digital Elevation Map and refilling the basin to 493 m, reconstructs South Fork Lake containing 16 million cubic meters of water ( Figure 5 ). Timing-South Fork Arrival. Testimony by Emma Erhefield, telegraph operator at South Fork, specifically times the flood. It first reached the junction of South Fork Creek and the Little Conemaugh River ( Figure 5 ) at " At 3 O'clock, probably a minute or two after" . C. P. Dougherty, Railroad Agent at South Fork confirms this timing. He testified that he found the South Fork station clock reading 3:08, stopped when the flood knocked the place off its foundation a few minutes after first arrival. Timing-Dam Failure. Timings of the dam failure vary, but both E. J. Unger and W. T. Sherman Showers testified that major water began to flow over the breast at 2:45 PM and that it was only minutes until the gap reached full size. My simulations require about 10 minutes for water to run the 3.6 km from the Dam to South Fork Junction. Given the firm 3 PM arrival time at South Fork, I place dam failure at 2:50 PM.-roughly 20 minutes earlier than often reported. Timing-East Conemaugh Arrival. Telegraph operator Charles V. Haak was specific about the flood's arrival at East Conemaugh Railway Yard (Figure 7a ). Watching the clock for a 4 PM shift change he says, " It came at exactly ten minutes of four." Going outside, he states that water jumped bank onto the railroad tracks a minute or two later. This timing is supported by Engineer V. Wierman who was walking the tracks about 2 km upstream of the Yard toward " AO" signal tower. He met the tower operator walking downstream on the track. Mr. Wierman recalls that the operator carried the AO station clock-stopped at 3:40 PM. The operator said that he had removed the clock just as flood took the tower into the river. Timing-Johnstown and Stone Bridge Arrival. T. H. Watt, Johnstown ticket agent described conditions at his house which stood " a great deal lower than the main Johnstown station and directly opposite. The flood struck us at 4:07." Corroboration comes from District Supervisor W. M. Hays who was on a railroad work party at the Stone Bridge attempting to clear the arches-already beginning to clog with debris. (Booms at the lumber storage yard in Stoney Creek River above Kernville had broken earlier that day piling hundreds of logs under the Bridge.) " About 4:10 our attention was attracted by people shouting, and I saw this bank of water and drift coming down the Conemaugh, almost like a wall. About 4:10, it crossed the town before it reached our bridge." Timing and Size of Causeway Breach. Period photographs show the causeway breach at the east end of the Stone Bridge repaired with temporary trestle. I measure the width of the breach to be well less than one-half the 170 m length of the bridge. Time of the causeway breach is indefinite, but " Somewhere past 5 PM" . For this simulation, the Stone Bridge and Causeway act like dam until I introduce a 70 m wide causeway gap at 5:10 PM. Timing-Lake Drainage and Flood Durations. Durations are elusive because while the flood initiated rapidly, it decayed away slowly. Rarely do accounts specify what defines the beginning and end of the interval. W. Y. Boyer, present at the dam, testified that it took " about an hour and ten minutes-for the lake to drain to creek bottom, but that others have different opinions." W. T. Sherman Showers states " about 2:45 the wearing away of the dam became more rapid, so that it was cut out quite fast and the water began to go through in great and still increasing quantities, so that by about four o'clock the main body of water had gone out." Placing full breakage at 2:50 PM, 4 o'clock equates to one hour and ten minutes for the Lake to drain, the same as Boyer's estimate. Because the tsunami balls follow longer and shorter paths in transit, certainly the duration of flood downstream must exceed the one hour ten minutes it took to pass the dam. Accounts that give a shorter flood duration must be suspect. 
Existing conditions water in channel.
It is agreed that the lower sections of J ohnstown stood awash waist high and more before the flood's arrival. Elsewhere, witnesses described the rivers as " bank full" . In the simulation, the Stone Bridge and Causeway act like a dam early on, so trapping additional tsunami balls (1.8 x 10 6 m 3 ) in river channels nearby submerges lower Johnstown under a meter or so of water. It is tougher to simulate bank full conditions in the upper reaches of the Little Conemaugh. Water placed there will simply run to Johnstown ahead and with the flood. While it is possible to start the simulation with tsunami balls in the upper channel, this simulation assumes it to be dry. Inundation Zone. A. A. Cadwell (1890) was in the final stages of assembling his " Atlas of Cambria Country, Pennsylvania" when the Flood struck. He quickly commissioned several existing Atlas' plates to be revised with hand coloring covering flooded districts of the Conemaugh Valley (Figure 4, left) . 4.1 DEM and dam failure conditions. I started this exercise by extracting a 1/ 9 arcsec (~3 m spacing) DEM from the USGS National Elevation Dataset and then down sampling to every third point (~10 m spacing). For the 1889 flood simulation, 1 million tsunami balls filled a reconstructed South Fork Lake. Behind a virtual dam of 493 m elevation sat 16 x10 6 m 3 of water. By all accounts, the dam failed within minutes after first breach. A few test runs suggest that whether dam failure happened instantly or over a few minutes does not alter significantly the flood history down stream. For my purposes, there is no need for additional model assumptions regarding timing of failure. There is also no need for additional model assumptions regarding the geometry of the breach because the immediate landscape has not been altered significantly since 1889. The simulations assume that the virtual dam instantly reverts to remnant dam's current shape. After releasing the tsunami balls, I follow the flow chart in Section 2, and update their acceleration, position and velocity every Δt=0.1s (inner loop), reform a new surface every 4s (outer loop) and generate a movie frame at 40s intervals.
Dynamic drag
The only remaining physical element to be fixed is the dynamic drag C d coefficient. C d imparts a terminal velocity to overland flow of
so the flood timings established in Section 3 heavily influence its selection. With C d too small, the flood arrives early. With C d too big, the flood arrives late. Another flow related aspect, is that by all accounts the flood onset rapidly in step-like pulses or waves. With water's natural tendency to spread out, how could it maintain a steep onset after an hour or more of travel? People speculated almost immediately that the flow dammed and re-dammed itself several times with transported debris and fallen obstacles (like Bridge #6, ~500 m east of AO tower). Each short-lived blockage, presumably trapped water behind and sent forward a pulse when it broke. While such things are possible, it is hard to say if multiple dams could survive long enough to have much effect or how much volume the blockages could retain to release as pulses. Another means to maintain steep onsets without multiple blockages lets C d depend upon the flow thickness H(r,t). If C d increases with H(r,t), thin flows that outrace the main body suffer more drag and lower terminal velocity (14). Thin vanguards will be forced to slow and wait for the main body. Thickness-dependent friction keeps the flow together and its onset steep. After several trial and error runs, the following form of C d (r,t) seemed to match all the information: ∇ζ r point directly down river. Too, in a contorted channel, the tsunami balls bounce back and forth between the walls slowing the advance of the flood. Lower v term can actually increase v flood because slower speeds reduce the bouncing and make for a shorter flow path. Figure 6 shows the initial phases of the 1889 flood in 2D map view at T= 00:00:00, 00:04:00 00:12:00, and 00:19:20. (Quicktime movie animations accompany all of the simulations presented in this article. See Appendix A. View the movie of Figure 6 at http:/ / es.ucsc.edu/~ward/ jtown-lake-close-s.mov). In Figure 6 and those that follow, the circled numbers measure peak flow depth to that time in meters anywhere along a vertical line passing through the circle. The small numbers in the thin white boxes list peak flow depth to that time at that position. The numbers in the thin yellow boxes list two-minute average flow rates past that location. Thin lines in the flow give time averaged (t 1/ 2 =80s) speed and direction. 
Output products.

Assessment of the 1889 flood simulation:
Having run the 1889 flood simulation, one asks --How well did it do? Did it match observations? Duration of Lake Drainage. The red line in the bottom panel of Figure 9 graphs volume past the dam versus time. About 50% of the lake volume evacuated in 25 minutes and 85% in 70 minutes. Earlier I recounted firm testimony that the lake drained " to creek bottom" in 1 hour-ten minutes. Simulation and observation coincide here. Timing and Flood Heights at South Fork. The simulated flood arrives at South Fork at 2:58PM ( Figure 6 , Frame C) and fully pushes upstream behind the South Fork Station by 3:09 PM (Figure 6, Frame D) . These times coincide with the telegraph operator's statement and the 3:08 time of the flood-stopped station clock. meters above river bed atop a single 80 foot diameter arch. All that we know for certain is that the Viaduct vanished during the flood. Some say that the arch clogged with debris when the flood cut across the oxbow ( Figure 6 , Panel E). Water then dammed behind, flowed over top by several feet, and eventually knocked down or undermined the structure. I have not discovered any definitive accounts to support or quantify the Viaduct story. Others suggest that, like the Stone Bridge, the Viaduct was far too massive to succumb to flood alone. Dynamite, they say, packed in a railroad boxcar washed down from S outh F ork struck and blew up the structure. To interpret the Viaduct story from a physics-based perspective, first consider water volume and timing. From the modern Digital Elevation Map, I find that damming the river at the Viaduct to the 444 m elevation of the railroad bed would impound 4.4 million cubic meters of water. Raising a temporary lake several feet over the tracks (to 446 m elevation) requires 5.6 million cubic meters. South Fork Lake held considerably more water than this, so if the Viaduct arch really could have dammed tight, and if the structure held in place long enough, the flood could have overtopped it. Timings remain an issue however, " Can sufficient water reach the Viaduct rapidly enough so that the well documented arrivals of the flood downstream can still be met?" Figure 9 (bottom) says that 4x10 6 m 3 of water passed South Fork in 25 minutes and 6x10 6 m 3 million in 34 minutes. Flood travel time from there, around the oxbow to the Viaduct is about 12 minutes. So, four million cubic meters could back up behind the Viaduct in 37 minutes or (3:27 PM) and 6 million by 46 minutes (3:36 PM). These volumes would be achieved a bit sooner if I added water already in the river channel to that of South Fork Lake. Recall that the flood must reach E. Conemaugh Rail Yard by 3:50 PM. In the simulation it takes about 25 minutes for the flood to travel from the Viaduct to the Rail Yard. Although the flood has a very tight schedule, conceivably water could have overtopped the Viaduct by 3:25-3:30 PM and still met the timing requirements down stream. Whether water really overtopped the Viaduct and whether flood or dynamite caused its demise, will take further forensic investigation. In any case, the simulation breaks the Viaduct at T=30:00 (3:20PM) after 5.06x10 6 m 3 have passed South Fork on the way to the short-lived lake. Timing and Flood Extent at E. Conemaugh and Woodvale. The simulated flood reached " AO" tower and the Rail Yard at 3:40 and 3:50 PM as the accounts state. Granted, I adjusted the dynamic drag coefficient C d and Viaduct failure time to generally meet these constraints. It might be noted that in 1889, the Little Conemaugh River circled a large oxbow between Mineral Point and the Rail Yard (Figure 9 ). The oxbow is abandoned now and the river course lost to mining operations. The modern river runs through a man made cut just west of the railroad cut extant in 1889. Eyewitnesses state that 1889 flood flowed many feet deep through the railroad cut and helped knock out Bridge #6 on the west side. It seems that much of the 1889 water bypassed the oxbow and followed a path not too different from the current one. Although the oxbow path is not included in the simulation, I do not believe that this substantially alters flood circumstances down stream. Still, a reconstruction of the old oxbow might be worth considering. The simulation puts 3 to 5 m of water over the Rail Yard (Figure 7, Panel D) . I have not discovered any definitive measurements of flood heights there for comparison. References to water marks on surviving locomotives do exist but, railroad beds stand a few to several meters higher than surroundings. The Yard's multiple parallel sidings of various elevations further complicate the interpretation of locomotive watermarks. Yard managers in fact did everything possible to park delayed trains as far up and away from the river as possible. Adjacent trains, even adjacent cars, fared better or worse depending on location. Although the depth of flooding here was uncertain, the extent was well indicated. Both Cadwell's Atlas and Railroad Testimony agree that flooding reached the third street in Conemaugh. The simulation (Figure 7, Panel D) finds no disparity. Timing and Flood Extent at Johnstown. The simulated flood passes the Main Station at 4:08 PM and reaches the Stone Bridge at 4:11 PM, in accord with the accounts. The models puts 3-7 m water over the town, nearly replicating the pattern of depths expected in a static " Lake Johnstown" filled to 361 m (Figure 10) . Few quantitative observations of water depth in the city exist. Most of the structures upon which one might measure it were destroyed. City Hall at Main and Market provides one definitive datum -a plaque marking high water, 6.4 m above grade. Nearby at Walnut and Lincoln, photographs show a clear high water mark on a surviving house. Judging from the size of a person standing in the photo, I fix flood height there at 6.7 m. The simulation predicts 6.1 m and 6.5 m at these two places -close enough. Further investigation should uncover other quantitative flood heights in the city and better test the " Lake Johnstown" hypotheses. I see no glaring mismatch between the predicted inundation zone in the city (Figure 10 ) and the flooded areas mapped in Cadwell's Atlas (Figure 4) . In Kernville and South Johnstown the simulated flood does extend a few streets beyond the mapped zone. I note that Cadwell's inundation limit at these places runs oblique to, rather than parallel with topographic contours. Inundation need not parallel topography in high-speed flows, but flooding oblique to topography is difficult to reconcile in this situation where water moves very slowly. Possibly, the artists painting the Atlas' plates were a little interpretative. Also as I mentioned, Cadwell's mapping likely speaks to the damage zone rather than inundation zone, the latter being more extensive. At the edges of a flood, water stands in the streets but inflicts no damage. Timing and Flood Extent at Cambria. The timing of causeway failure dictates the onset of the simulated flood at Cambria Iron Works and Cambria Town. Time of causeway failure (5:10 PM) is a kinematic input parameter. I do not have any independent timings of the flood in Cambria, but there may be quantitative information from witnesses further down river that could be brought to bear. Comparing inundation zones in Figure 10 with Figure 4 , I see that the simulation puts a considerably wider flood track over the Iron Works than did Cadwell. Compared with other locations in the Valley, the Iron Works was rather featureless (few roads) and its steel construction distinct from and perhaps stronger than the wood frame construction elsewhere. I do not know how well the Atlas mapped inundation in the industrial zone. In Cambria Town, the residential area across the river, the simulated flood extent agrees with the Atlas within a street or two. Overall Assessment. In my opinion, the Johnstown Flood simulation successfully reproduces the bulk of credible historical information to the extent that that information is quantified. Additional facts affirming or contradicting its predictions will certainly come to light, and the model may need modification. Regardless, the exercise demonstrates that realistic physics-based simulations of long-run river floods are achievable with modest laptopcomputer resources. When applied in an historical context, physics-based models add new dimensions and flavors to " storytelling" accounts and they help contemporary folk better understand and appreciate the drama of that day. 
Conclusions
The May 31, 1889 Johnstown Flood was a tragic engineering and societal failure. I approach the story for the first time from a science-based perspective. By combining text and photographic information to constrain dynamic and kinematic parameters, the simulations successfully capture in time and space the full sequence of events including: the breaking of and initial high flow rate through the dam, the down draw of the lake, the counter flow flooding at South Fork, the overtopping of the Viaduct, the valley-filling expansion of the flood at E. Conemaugh, the creation of " Lake Johnstown" behind the Stone Bridge, the back flow up Stoney Creek River, the failure of the causeway, the flooding of Cambria and the eventual passage of the flood. Being more than artist's conceptions, physics-based simulations can accept input from a wide range of observational information and they can output quantitative predictions on many aspects that could not be measured. For instance, the simulation estimates that the
